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English filer you kηow: 
an approach from relevance-theoretic account 
Daisuke YAMADA 
1 Introduction 
I七wasGrice (1975/89) who pioneered the importanc巴ofinference in 
language communication. The aspect芯ofutterance interpretation, which are 
explained by Grice by using the cooperative principle and its maxims, have 
been explained through the concept of inference, distinguishing ‘what is 
said' from implicatur巴inconversations. On the other hand, relevance theory 
as a cog凶tivepragmatic theory attempts to reveal the works of mind-reading 
abilities in human language communications and proposes an u七terance
int巴rpretationhypothesis. That is, i七takesa status of supposing our human 
cognitive system has th巴principleof relevance. This tries to keep the 
optimal balance between processing efforts of interpr巴tationsand the worth 
of accessible information, thus the inference controlled by its principle 
achieves human u七巴ranceinterpretation. Relevance th巴oryis a pragmatic 
principle of how human cognitiv巴processesare explainable in utterance 
interpretation. Accordingly, the existence of semantics, which operates 
closely with human cognitive proc巴s,can b巴consideredin utterance 
interpretation. 
This r巴searchfocuses on language filer you know, which is used as link 
betw巴巴nutterances as in (1). Look at ex紅nple(1), which is used utt巴ranc巴目
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initially with another filer well. Without using such filers as in (le), the 
hearer, or Mary, probably can understand what Tom wants to tel, but more 
natural communication can be done with using them. Of course, because 
nuances b巴tweenthe uses of you kηow and well are also differ巴ntwith 
comparison of (la) and (1 b), both meanings are probably different. 
〔1〕 Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Maηr: The tickets? 
Tom: (a) You know, the circus tickets. 
(b) Well, the circus tickets. 
(c) Th巴circustickets. 
What this research attempts to discuss is how the filer you k旬。wworks 
with the fran1e work of relevance theory.羽なlatwil be presented here is as 
follows; (i) th巴血leryou know is language information which constraints on 
procedural meaning of utterances, (i) it contributes to a higher-level 
explicature of speaker’s utterance. Finally, C山〕w由examine(i) and (i), and 
a semantic mear吐ngof you kηow as a unitary account will b巴proposedby 
using the concept of metarepresentation. In the next chapter, three previous 
works will be examined, which is al analysed the filer you kηow. In Chapter 
3, various appearances of you know will be presented, which are extracted 
from the ENC database. Chapter 4 will explain the concept of relevance 
theory, which is the theoretical framework in this research. Taking into 
consideration the conc巴ptof metarepresentation, Chapter 5 w坦proposea 
S巴manticmeaning of you know as a unitary account with a comparison of 
Blakemore’s (2002) well discussion. Finally, the data presented in. Chapter 
3 will demonstrate how the unitary account is organised. This research 
would like to show that such a tiny language factor w出 greatlyeffect on 
human communication. In the next chapter, we attempt to get an insider’s 
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view of previous studies, which discuss the filer you know. 
2 Literature review 
There have not been any previous studies discussing the filer you kηow 
from relevance-th巴oreticperspectives as of yet. The previous studies 
presented here are al from oth巴rrelated fields. This paper mainly focuses 
on three studies; Crystal and Davy (1975), Schf仕in(1987), Holmes (1986, 
1995). These three studies each discuss the filer you know from a different 
perspective; Crystal and Davy discuss巴dthe filer you know as a soft開 er
based on intonation changes. Schffrin focused on the mea凶ngof you kηow 
compared with the filer I meαn, and Holmes discussed the filer you know 
as having ambiguous m巴anings.Examining these studies in detail, we c釘1
see how the meaning and function of the filer you know has been treated. 
2.1 Crystal and Davy (1975) 
The main purpose of Crystal and Davy’s (1975) discussion is to show that 
phrases such as you know and sort of have a function as softening 
utterances or discourses. They called such phrases softeners. The analysis of 
softener is based on intonation changes. As a function of linking, such 
sojteηers as you 的 owand sort of are employed with intonation changes. 
Crystal and Davy also discussed the place of appearance; esp巴cially
concerning the filer you know, and then classified into sentence-ir由ial,
medial, and final. It is best to see their research from these two asp巴cts.
2.1.1 As a so武ener 
As a softener, Crystal and Davy gave examples as you know, you see, I 
meα.n, mind you，釘ldyes/no. They classified them as so丘巴ningconn巴ctives.
Concerning the filler you know, they discussed it with the place of 
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appearance; on sentence-initial, medial, and final. Depending on its place of 
appearance, they discussed that the functions (and meanings〕ofthe f出er
you 加 owwould change. The analysis as softener is based on Quirk et al. 
(1972). They treated it as comment clauses, and defined it as follow. 
(2) Comment clauses are som巴whatloosely related to the rest of the 
clause they belong to, and may be classes as disjuncts or 
conjuncts. In general, they may occur initialy, or medially, and 
they have a s巴paratetone unit. Quirk et al. (1972, 778) 
Concerning the discussion of soften巴ryou know, they treat it as a main 
clause, and gave the ex釘uplesee in (3). 
(3) Like a main clause 
At that t訂ue,I believe, labour was cheap. 
Th巴五lieryou know is discussed as立抗waspart of main clause in sentence 
〔thatis, having the same nature as (3〕.The comment clauses here are not 
only you kηow but also including other phrases such as I Kπow, I se, I 
suppose, I'm afraid, you know, remember, one heαrs，仇eytel me, God 
knows, and it is claimed (Quirk et al. 1972, 778〕ObservingQuirk et al.'s 
analysis as comm巴ntclauses, it would appear that there may not be many 
differences from the analysis of sojteηers by Crystal and Davy. N巴edlessto 
say, it is quite natural that one would like to convey additional meanings of 
such filers but these mean泊gshave not been discussed at al. At泊1yrate, it 
can easily be seen that Crystal and Davy’s analysis was based on the 
com me叫 clαuseanalysis, but they conducted it in greater detail from 
intonation chang巴sThere might b巴somerelations between the filer you 
know and its intonation changes in sentences. 
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2.1.2 You know with intonation changes 
Crystal and Davy (1975) insist that the d江'ferenc巴ofintonation changes 
could e丘ectthe m巴a工lingitself of you kηow, shown in (4): 
( 4) a. you I know I heI works on S白~days I 
b. you I know he 'works on SUNdays I . 
(Crystal and Da可 1975,92〕
Both (4a〕and(4b) have the same proposition, but depended on the place of 
intonation, the word you know is treated as filer in ( 4a〕，whileyou kηow in 
(4b) is on巴ofthe propositions in the sentence. Not only with (4) but other 
appearances as well, Crystal and Davy explaむlhow you kηow occurs with 
other positions as explained in 2.1.1. If a speaker uttering certain you k旬口ω
clause such as (14), the hearer co叫daclmowledge the filer you kηow or 
not. 
The worthy discussion point of Crystal and Davy’s intonation based study 
is, first and foremost, they classified the positions of appearance into three 
parts. Setting aside the problem of its function as sojteηer, it is very worth 
wh立eto tak巴thisresearch into consideration. The pos抗ionof the filer well 
is said to be more restricted than the filer you know (see 5.2.1). 
The problems ar巴， firstly,that the meaning as sゆeηeris not explained 
perfectly, especially its meaning and function. Secondly, which may be the 
most serious problem, is that the judgements of intonation changes are not 
perfectly equal for any native sp巴ak巴rs,which can be proved with nativ巴
speaker’s judgements C1l. It might be helpful to discuss intonation changes of 
1 The judgement of intonation changes by n抗ivespea』<erhas not been consistent: even if a short 
sentence such as (14〕，somenative speakers of English answer it is going up, others reply it is 
st出flat.Other sentences given in Chapter 3 c阻 beno七alsojudged consistently, throughout 
data colection. Accordingly，抗 C阻 bepredicted that only native spealcer’s judgement cannot 
ob七ainedthe proper data〔referto 3.1〕， andmoreover intonation changes is not helpful to 
explain the use of yo,; k；叫ow.
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the filer you kηow as a softener, but it is quite risky for nativ巴speakersto 
mak巴ajudgement the only meanings with only intonation changes. 
2.2 Schiffrin (1987) 
Schiffrin’s approach analyses the filer you know with I meαn, and d巴宜nes
the meaning of you know as a marker of interactive transitions加 shared
lmowledg巴asfollow. 
(5〕“thefunctions of I meαn and you know are complementary: 
wher巴asI meαn focuses on the speaker's own adjustments in the 
production of his/her own talk, you know proposes that a hearer 
adjust his/her orientation (specifically, knowledge and attention〕
toward the reception of another’s talk.”（Schiffi恒 1987,309)
According to her words, this suggests that combinations such as you kηOW 
and I meαn, may actually accomplish virtually the same interactive task, 
albeit in the opposite order. She proposed both mea凶ngsshown in figure (6〕
below. 
I mean 
＼＼＼＼‘ 
恥！kerorient！：ケ
invites hearer attention 
/ 
y’'know 
／ 
ノ
ノ
／ 
hearer assessment o丙函li:ion
sha凶ぷ7つ；~i:ed opinion 
Figure (6): Schiffrin (1987, 310) 
At first glance, figure (6) could precisely express both functions. The major 
difference between them is that you know is used to invite hearer attention, 
English filer you know：田anapproach from relevance-theoretic account 81 
while I mea怜 isfrom speaker orientation. However, there are two problems 
with tils explanation. First of al, the difference between shared knowledge 
and disputed opinion (shown in th巴figureas well) are not explained. It’s 
highly doubtful that they need to be divided in七otwo categories. The 
discussion was not mentioned the r巴asonfor this. If we explain this 
knowledge or information with relevance-th巴oreticapproach, they are 
relevant information between the speaker and hearers, and can be obtained 
from participant’s encyclopaedic knowledg巴information.The second 
problem, which is the worst fault, is that the judgement of the filer you 
know. Let us consider two sentences (7〕and(8), which both are introduced 
in the discussion of the filer you kηow by Schiffrin. 
(7) Zelda: You know that took care of Henry when he had hls back? 
(Schiffrin 1987, 271) 
(8) Zelda: D-you know the t巴am日目
Irene: Oh, VIなla’dγmeanthe ldds. (Schlffrin 1987, 272) 
The treatment such uses of you know is not permitt巴din these sentences as 
filers, b巴causethey are a part of the proposition on each s巴nt巴nee.Th巴us巴
of you know in sentence (7) is interrogative. It can be considered that thls 
sentence is a ldnd of omission of the auxiliary V巴rb“Do”onthe head. The 
use in (8) is also difficult to treat as the filer you kηow as well, the same 
reason as in (7). Such sentences show the possibility that you know is not 
always us巴das filer. To prev巴ntsuch ldnds of confusion, thls research set up 
a criterion (see 3.1) divided the filer you know into separate classifications. 
2.3 Holmes (1986, 1995) 
Holmes (1986) focused on the basic meanings of th巴fileryou know by 
placing it into two categories c巴rtaintyand uncertainty. In 1995, she did 
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another study exploring the difference between women’s and men’s speech 
from politeness persp巴ctiv巴S〔2〕 Thecone巴ptof expressing certainty has 
thre巴釦rth巴rmeanings; co吋ointlmowledge, emphatic, and attributive. She 
explained them as follows (9). 
(9) 
Conjoint lmowledge: 
Emphatic: 
Attributive: 
The speaker uses you kηow almost literally to 
introduce what she regards as incontestable 
mutual lmowledge, to refer to the fact that the 
speaker knows the addressee already knows the 
information being asserted in the proposition. 
To emphasize, intensify, or boost the strength of 
the sp巴巴chact, to stress th巴 speaker’s 
confidence and hence reassure the addressee 
concerning the validity of the proposition 
asserted (There is no assumption that the 
addressee already knows the information being 
ass巴rted).
To巴xpressthe speak巴r’scertainty concerning 
the validity of the proposition and also express 
the speaker’S confidence that addressee knows, 
as a r巴sultof past experience. 
(Holmes 1986) 
2 Holmes (1995〕hasdeveloped the argumentation of you k叩owwith poli七enesstheoretic 
perspectives. Through data colection 宜omNe'!" Zealand society, the functions (and meanings) 
of百OU初w叩 hasdiscussed and are divided into two aspects; afective me叩.ing〔alsoas positive 
politeness〕andreferential meaning. She discusses you 加 owwith approach of Ostman〔1981,
39 41〕.He discusses it with the terms of Coherence level and Politeness-Modality level. The 
study of Holmes 〔1995)is originaly from l匂V田iousmeanings in Holmes (1986, 1990) to discuss 
them from its me血'lings.Dixon田1dFoster (1997〕alsodiscusses the血leryou know as a hedge, 
based from Holrnes's approach. 
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The emphatic use has a t巴ndencywhich it often appears on the sentence-
final and m巴dial. Expressing uncertainty has only two sub-categorised 
meanings: appealing and linguistic imprecision as in (10). 
(10) 
App ea並lg: To express the speaker’S unc巴rtaintylack of 
confidence. 
Linguistic imprecision: To express the speaker’s uncertainty 
concerning aspects of the linguistic expression 
of the proposition. 
。） Signalling lexical impr巴cision
（並） Introducing I qualiかinginformation 
〔出〕 IndicatingFalse Start 
(Ho加1巴s1986) 
The use of appealing oft巴ncomes at the sentence-final. As Lakoff〔1975,54〕
proposed, the appealing use of the filer you k旬。wmay often used by 
women than by men, and it gives th巴impressionthat the speaker lacks 
authority or doesn’t know what h巴istalking about. 
Regarding linguistic imprecision use, she classified this into thre巴further
叫 egories,shown in (i) to （山） in (10). 
Generally, Holmes takes the position that the fil巴ryou know has various 
m巴anings.The root of its ambiguous meanings is based on two kinds of 
cat巴gories:certainty and uncertainty. Holmes explained these two main 
distinctions as follow. 
(11) I found two broad categories that proved valuable, one巴xpressing
speak巴rconfid巴nceor c巴rtainty,the oth巴rreflecting uncertainty 
of various kinds. (Ho加1巴s1986, 7) 
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Holmes did not explain this in detail. It is quite difficult to see why she 
divided them into two categories as in (11). Meanings presented by Holmes 
have not covered al uses, however (for instance, examples such as (23〕and
(24), which will be referred in Chapter 3, had not discussed in this 
category). It cannot be conclud巴dthat Holmes’s study is well-organis巴deven 
if this research permits the ambiguous m巴anings.Nevertheless, this study 
might be a kind of trigger for malting argumentation of you know, especially 
concerning its presentation of meanings. 
We have seen the filer you know ar呂町nentationsfrom thr巴巴 different
fields. On the whole，北 wouldbe hard to say that巴achres巴archperfectly 
explained the meanings the filler you kηow has, if compared to al 
appearances of you know in Chapter 3. Particularly, no study has discussed 
巴xample(24) before. From the presentation and arguments from each 
r巴search,however, there can be seen as follows: (a) The nature of you 
know when in its places of appearanc巴，（b)the fact that it has many 
meanings, or is ambiguous meanings, (c) and the reliability of native 
speake内 judgement(refer to 3.1). Taking these ideas or making use of 
th巴m,this r巴searchwil be proposed a meaning of you know with relevance-
theoretic account. B巴forethat, we need to set up a criterion about data 
collection, and present various appearances of th巴fileryou know. 
3 Data collection of the filler you know 
3.1 Data from the British National Corpus 
The method of collecting data is one of the most important issues to 
consider before discussing the filer you know. Th巴combinationof the ENC 
database and gr紅nmaticaljudgment by native sp巴akersof English, which we 
are attempting to achieve here, will b巴strengthenedby the reliability of the 
data we need to use. 
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Two processes have been arranged for data collection of the filer you 
know (See Appendix A). The first step is mainly about data collection (or 
sentence collection〕fromthe BNC, and the second is about context 
formation from th巴seextract巴dsentences which are worthwhile in 
discussing the filer you know through pragmatics based research. 
The main point of the first step is to consider how properly the filer you 
know data can be col巴ctedfrom the BNC database. Needless to say, it can 
be predicted that al data on this form of words extracted from the database 
cannot be classified as a filer. I七ispossible that other non-filler factors such 
asιdo you know…’in interrogative sentences orι…you know it’，‘… you 
know whαs !meαη’m declarative sentences can be obtain巴d.Obviously, 
they cannot be treated as the filer you know. Nevertheless, even if w巴could
obtain the filer you kηow from the BNC, in some of the sentences it is not 
possible to judge whether they are a filer or not at first glance, as given in 
(14). This may lead to misleading data collection, which will then affect the 
argumentation itself. Consequently, we have to set up a criterion for the 
methodology of data collection of you k冗owsentences. 
京市atwe need to consider the most her巴is,as the first step, wheth巴ral 
you know sentences as a filler can b巴includedinto their attach巴d
propositions. A filer can be d巴finedas a part of speech that usually has no 
grammatical conn巴ctionto the rest of the sentence, which is to say that 
there is no grammatical connection to the proposition of the sentence. If we 
can consider that they are included, then they are not filers because they 
cannot be judged to be the filer you know. You kη口wsentences, which are 
included in d巴clarativeand interrogative sentences, and some fixed forms 
composed with you know, such as“αs you know”or“αs longαs you 
knowヘaregood巴xamples.If we cannot consider that you kηow sentences 
are not included when that expression is attached to propositions, it might 
be possible to say that they are al the filer you know. This is the first 
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process in establishing these criteria (The result is in Appendix B-1). 
It is clear that we cannot obtain the proper data if we carry out only the 
first criterion above. As seen in the first step, al you know clauses, which 
are plac巴doutside of their propositions, can be treat巴das filers, and 
conversely, you know clauses within propositions are not always classified 
as filers. (12) is one good example, which is the same sent巴nceas (4〕：
(12) You know he works on Sunday. 
N巴edlessto say, wh巴nwe tak巴youknow sent巴ncesfrom the ENC, th巴
cont巴xtand structures in which th巴sentencesar巴utt巴redare not explained 
or referred to at al. That is, only pl伺nsentences can be accessed. So, in the 
case of such sentences as in (12) it is quite difficult to make judgements 
whether the clause you kηow is a filer or other factor in declarative 
sentences; in“do you know…”for instance, "you”would be a subject and 
“know”a verb of the sentence (12). But, even in (12〕，ifwe und巴rstandthe 
context in which the sentence (12) is uttered, ev巴nif a non-native speaker 
of English, we can probably understand the nature that you伽 owsentences 
have. Hence, grammatical judg巴mentand the context formation by native 
speal<ers of English would be needed concerning such you know sentences. 
This is the basis of the second step. 
The second step is about grammatical judgment and context formation by 
native speakers of English. As seen above, al you know s巴ntencescannot 
always be classified as smoothly as in (12). In some sentences it is n巴cessary
to be dependent on gr釘nmaticaljudgement by nativ巴speal<ers.This is the 
second step in this r巴search,and the process will be established in two 
stages (referred to as 2-1 and 2-2 below in Appendix A). 
The first judgement process加th巴secondstep (2-1〕isabout the context 
formation of you know sentences. All obtained sentences from the ENC and 
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previous studies are clasifi巴das the fil巴ryou know from the first step as in 
Appendix B-1 and B-2. As we lmow however, they are just plain sentences 
and no contexts are attached. Hence, what we need to focus on th巴most
her巴isabout setting up the contexts in which you kηow sentences are 
utt巴red,and their meanings. According to the positions of you know claus巴S
(sent巴nce-initial,medial, and final), and along with th巴irmearせngs,each 
context will be derived as in Appendix B-3. These you kηow utterances 
which are composed in the context of their supposed utterances are 
presented to native speakers of English. First of al we ask one native 
speaker of British English to make a judgm巴ntwhether the filer you kηow 
utterances are acceptable. Then, al utterances are classified according to 
whether they are acceptable, non-acc巴ptabl巴， orothers (which is a difficult 
judgement to make). 
Ne巴dless七osay, it is natural that grammatical judgement by native 
speakers needs to be performed with many speakers to provide proof of 
their acceptability as the filer you know. To do so, we asked more than 10 
British English speakers, or English speakers living in the Unit巴dKingdom, 
for further grammatical judg巴mentconcern主lgthese utterances. This is the 
second judgement (2-2〕.In the same way as the first grammatical judgement 
with one native speaker, we ask for the acceptability of these you know 
utterances and their meanings. At the sam巴出ne,in accordance with Crystal 
and Davy’s (1975) study, we ask about intonation changes such as rising, 
falling or flat. This may be one of the means by which to reveal something 
about the nature of the filer you know. 
All speakers might say that a you kηowu抗er紅lceis not acceptabl巴，but
even if one native speak巴rchooses that th巴utterancecan be acceptable we 
need to be able to make an argument for it as a filer. In this way, the you 
know sentences as宜Ilercan be used as example sentences. 
It has often been said that the intuition of native speakers is extremely 
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obscure. Corpus data is also not perfect for discussion in th巴fieldof 
pragmatics, as mentioned abov巴.However, the intuition of native speakers 
w世 behelpful in making these judgments in context. So, it is possible that 
W巴canobtain more natural data through a combination of grammatical 
judgement and corpus data collection. For this r巴ason,this research 
performed data collection and used the results in arg山田ntation.
3.2 Various appe町 ancesof the filler you know 
Taking into consid巴rational BNC data, we can see almost al us巴ofyou 
kηow. To attempt to present a w'li.tary account of you kηow as a semantic 
meaning, w巴n巴巴dto look into the various uses of you kηow and present a 
crit巴riato present you kηow as a filer. According to it, this research 
pres巴ntsal data here. First of al, let us look at an example from Crystal and 
Daηr (1995) of utt巴rance-initialuse. 
(13) [Tallcing about the tickets they are going to obtain] 
Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Mary: The tickets? 
Tom: You know, the circus tickets. 
(Modified from Crystal and Davy 1975, 93) 
Concerning Mary’s question about what type of tickets Tom is talking about, 
Tom attempts to assert that the ticket they ar巴talcingabout now is for the 
circus. If Tom does not use the filer you kπow, Mary might b巴abl巴to
understand what Tom wants to convey to her, however, by using the filer 
the conversation is much natural and the hearer is able to understand bett巴r
th巴sp巴aleer’s intention. In this way, it is understandable that such the tiny 
expression can have some effects between a speaker and hearer’s 
interaction. This use of you kηow occurs on utteranc←initial, but also can 
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occur on sentenceイmalor medial. Crystal and Davy (1995〕discussesthe 
filer you kηow as divided into three positions. This research is based on 
asp巴ctof Crystal and Davy’s filer position argument. 
The use of you kηow on utteranc巴泊itialin (13) possibly has an intention 
of a speaker to assert to the hearer. The use of you know on sent巴nce－註吐tial
does have a meaning of assertion. The use in (14〕， whichis different from 
the us巴（13),might not have the meaning of the speaker’s assertion. 
(14) A: I may catch a cold, and need some medicine. 
B: You know, they say an apple a day keeps the doctor 
away? (Schiffrin 1987, 275) 
Suppose that th巴speaker’sfriends are talking about effects of medicine 
when they have a cold. Speaker B utters you know clause to say a related 
idea. This time, there is a possibility that not only the speaker but th巴
hearers should lmow this kind of proverb as their lmowledge as well. Th巴
speaker tries to use in the already known information as lmowl巴dgeof the 
conversation between them, using the filer you know. The use of the filer 
you know may have a function such as activator between their knowledge 
and already lmown information. One may se巴thisutterance as interrogative, 
but actually it is not. It would appear that the filers you kηow担（14)are 
both us巴dby the speaker try to bring加 someth加gnew註!formationto the 
conversation. 
The uses of you k旬。win(15) (16) are slightly different from that above: 
(15) [Conc巴rninga question about relation between the two] 
I though七thatwe were fri巴ndslike. You know, lik巴boyfri巴nd
and girlfriend. (BNC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
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(16) [A, talking with friend BJ 
A: It was the first t訂neI entered the music room. 
B: Which room? 
A: You know，七haむlovelyroom with its medi巴valinstruments. 
〔BNC,Tomorrow 1991) 
Example (15) and (16) are both include sen七ence-initialuse of you kηow. 
The speaker in (15〕wouldlike to assert that 'th巴yare friends but it is not 
just friends, rather more special relation like lovers'. Using the fil巴ryou 
伽 owon the head of the latter ut回raneeas a trigger, the speaker wants to 
give a more concrete explanation. Example (16) can be explained the same 
wayas (15〕， asan introduction of a concrete explanation. The speaker A, 
who has entered the music room before, wants the hearer to ident町 th巴
room, and then he tries to introduce some of the features about it. These 
uses of you know are a fair bit different from th巴formersentence-initial 
uses, because of speaker’s assertion and introducing new information uses. 
They might be able to be captured as‘presenting (or adding) concret巴
example uses'. From collecting al data here, we consider that the sentence-
initial use of you know has mainly thr巴eme釘lings.
The use of you kηow appears on sentence-medial as well, and has four 
meaning; introducing new information, presenting (or adding) concrete 
example, sp巴aker’sassertion, and reconfirmation. Sentence (1 7）加d(18) 
show introducing new information and a presenting (or adding) concrete 
example. 
(17) [Bily tels his daughter, Marie] 
Bily: I suppose if you work at night you got to sleep during th巴
day. Marie used to do that when I met her -you know, 
sleep al day and then go out at凶ght.
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(ENC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
(18) [Talking about TV progr釘runewith friends] 
It isn’t really like balet, but it looks sort of real -you know, lik巴
Candid Camera. (ENC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
As加sentence(17), the speak巴rhave an intention that wants the hearer to 
know som巴whatn巴W information about his daughter with the use of you 
kηow. Wha七thespeaker wants to assert on you kηow clause here〔you
加 ow,sleep al day and then go out at night) is to present new information 
about his daughter. We can consider that this is one of th巴goodexamples of 
informing new information. In sentence (18), the speaker utters the 
sentence with the f出eryou kηow to attempt to refer to more concrete 
information than the former sentenc巴（here,it looks sort of real). Th巴
proposition of the latter clause （出eCandid Camera〕startswith like. You 
k旬。wis also a kind of a marker for introducing concret巴information.Both 
th巴fil巴ryou know and prepos此10nlike may have similar functions or share 
a function together <3J. Without you know on the head of latter utterance, 
the hearer can understand what the sp巴akerintends to say. By adding the 
filer there, however, we may be able to see some additional intentions 
smoothly such as speal<er's assertion that th巴sp巴akerwants to convey to the 
hearer. Among utterance-medial use of you kηow, the mean加gof speaker's 
assertion is also acc巴ptabl巴.Let us look at sentence (19〕・
(19〕 A: I suppose that it’s summer in New Zealand now. 
B: Yes it is. But/ However, you know, the weather is not 
much better than here at the moment. 
3 In fact, by extracting from the BNC data base, many the filer you kno叩 datacombined with 
proposition like is available. 
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(Mod江led企omBlakemore 2002, 96) 
(20) [Mariana bowls out Trent for any reason] 
I’m not useless, you know, and you can’t do everything on your 
own. (ENC, Alistair MacL巴an’sgolden girl 1992〕
This is the example when Blakemor巴（2002)discussed discour・S巴markers
but and however. As an appearance on sentence-medial use of you 伽 ow,
this use is also quit巴natural.By adding this filer on this sentence, the 
hearer might see that七hespeaker B wants to convey some additional 
information. The use of you kηow might hide the speaker’s implicit 
intention. The intention here r吐ghtbe an assertion from the speaker. In case 
of (20), the speaker wants to confirm the speaker’s feeling to the hearer with 
the use of you kηow. If you kηow is not used, the utterance itself in the 
context is somewhat odd. Sentence (20〕maybe a typical巴xamplewhich 
expresses the speaker’B reconfirmation. 
Thirdly and finaly, we would like to see the sentence-final use of you 
know. Th巴reare two kinds of meanings here; speaker’s assertion and 
reconfirmation. Let us look at example (21): 
(21) [Speaker looks at Dorothy, who does not look good feeling] 
A: What’s going on Dorothy? What has been happeningつ
You look really pale, you know. 
〔ENC,Part of the加凶ture1991〕
Speaker has an intention to want to assert something strongly that has in 
立山ld.The speaker may want to worηr about Dorothy’s physical condition. 
On the other hand, there is another use of you know, which appears on 
th巴endof sentences. L巴tus look at (22〕：
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(22) A: Do you lmow him? 
B: I la1ow Ian. H巴looksvery handsome now. He is an actor, 
you know? 
A: Yeah, his eyes are a veηr nice colour. 
(Modi虫色dform BNC, The meddlers 1970) 
You know utterances in (22) might not be used for speak巴r'sassertion of 
the sentenc巴’scontents, or for confirmation or agr巴巴mentto hearers. 
Sp巴akerBus巴sthe filer you kηow to emphasise that Ian is an actor. 
The appearances of you know occurs on various places such as sentence目
initial, medial, and final. It is urely possible, however, that they would occl町
more than twice in th巴samesent巴nceas in (23). 
(23) [Looking at a friend who is riding a horse for the first time] 
You know, he loops up on the horse, you know. 
(BNC, Appreciation of literature 1950) 
Sentence (23〕showsthe use of you know use on the utteranc巴ーinitialand 
final. Although巴achof its uses appears on th巴sameutt巴rance,each mearせng
might be intuitionally different. It may be proof that there are more than two 
meanings and is possibly ambiguous, depending on its position in th巴
sentence. 
As in (24), different from its other uses, the filer you know is us巴dalone. 
Other us巴snormally associates with sentences, but this kind of utterance is 
also acceptable. 
(24) A: 京市atdid you say? 
B: Oh, you know. 
A: What? 
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B: Just, I wanted to ask what your faロilywas il沈
This use ofyou kηow has nev巴rbeen discussed before, but from relevance-
theoretic perspective, this research tries to consider抗alongside the other 
appearances in a unitarγaccount. 
As we have seen, the tiny filer you know has various appearances, which 
can be in different positions and have particular meanings or functions. In 
the n巴xtchapter, the fundamental framework in this research will be 
presented. 
4 Relevance theory 
4.1 Principle of relevance 
The fund紅nentalconcept of relevance theory, which is initialy introduced 
by Sperber and Wilson (1986/95〔4〕） is that al human utterances are based on 
a basic assumption, which al cognitive acts are from what humans interpret 
their acts巴achother. Human cognition is geared towards the max註凶zation
of relevance. We pay attention only the information being relevant, and deal 
with information within this context, and therefore, our cognitive 
environment is expected to be improved by us. If newly obtained information 
gives a proof to th巴truthfulnessof a pr巴viouslyobtain巴dassumption, the 
assumption wil be reinforced. Or, if the assumption is contradicted, it wil 
be discarded and replaced with a new assumption. If new information is 
connect巴dwith the already obtain巴dinformation, we can obtain a furth巴r
new assumption as a result of an interaction of the two assumptions. If th巴
improvement of cognitive environment is defined as cognitive effect, the 
greater the effects w巴canobtain, the larger the relevance of obtained 
information. Relevance theory defines the relationship b巴tweenthe human 
4 The first edition was publisl-iect in 1986. 
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cognitive system and information interaction as the Cognitive Principle of 
Relevance shown in (25). 
(25) First or Cognitive Principle of Relevance: 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of 
relev組 ce. (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 262) 
To obtain th巴cognitive巴ffect,efforts in dealing with information ar巴
req四 ed.If being able to obtain the s釘neeffects, we desire to communicate 
with minimum effort. An utterance should be relevant to a receiver, so 
accordingly, the speak巴rhas intentions there are some rewards to the 
receiver and r巴qu巴stsmentally his efforts. On七heother hand, the h巴arer
expects some reward for cognitive effects, so he attempts to do utterance 
interpretation. This is the second principle, which is called the 
Communicative Principle of Relevance shown in (26): 
(26〕 Secondor Communicative Principle of Relevance: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a 
presumption of its own optimal relevance. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995, 271) 
Humans normally pay attention to relevant stimuli, so it is q凶tenatural that 
the speaker utters relevant utterances enough to be worthwhile to paying an 
att巴ntionto the hearer. Accordingly, if the speaker attracts hearer’B 
attention and her ostensive intention is clarified to him, the hearer will b巴
guaranteed to be the relevant level from speaker’S ostensive stimulus (or 
utterances). On the other hand, the ostensive utterance is an interpretation 
that (a〕beingrelevant to worth while to pa戸時attentionto hearer and also 
(b〕beingthe most relevant along with the capacity and加terestof languag巴
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participants. This is called ιoptimally relevant’interpretation. If the speaker’s 
exp巴ctationof optimal relevance governs eve巧rkinds of ostensive utterance 
interpretation, the speaker chooses a linguistic form which the hearer can 
recover easily and moreover exp巴ctsto accomplish the satisfactory effects to 
the hearer. This is an interpr叫ationwhich the hearer can obtain with the 
least efort, that抗tosay, the speaker’s intended interpretation. Hearer is led 
to explore minimum effort, so if the interpretation accessed immediately 
satisfies the hearer’B relevance, the interpret加gprocess will end there. 
4.2 Conceptual and procedural encoding 
One of th巴maindistinctions is the conceptual and proc巴duralencoding of 
language. Many natural languages have mentally encoded information, and 
make up its logical form. The output of this language module is conceptual 
representation. Blakemore (1987) firstly introduced the idea that, however, 
there is language information which encodes inf巴rentialprocess, not 
involved in representation. This type of languag巴informationis encoded a 
procedural meaning, which is specialised for indicating the irぜerentialroute 
to hearers. The巴xistenceof this information would b巴alongwith th巴
sp巴aker’S泊tentionto accomplish the intended effects with立tin主numefort. 
So, information which can constrain the computation process is considered 
to involve in saving the efforts. This is the basis of distinction betw巴enthe 
conceptual and procedural encoding in utterances. 
Almost al linguistic expressions encode conceptual information. 
According to Blakemore’s (1987, 1992〕explanation,consider the concept of 
languages encoding proc巴duralinformation. 
(27) a. Peter is not stupid. 
b. He can look up words in the dictionary. 
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As interpreting (27), it is quite clear that the speaker has intention between 
two utterances. However, speaker’s intention cannot be conveyed to the 
hearer al the time. For instance, (27a〕wouldbe a premise or proof of 
(27b〕， orwe could think that (27b) is a premise and (27b) is conclusion. If 
th巴reis language information between two utt巴rancesto indicate an 
inference to hearer, it will be quite helpful to interpret (27). As Blakemore’s 
(1987, 85-91) explanation, so given in (28) and afterαl in (29) are both 
along with this function. 
(28〕 a. Peter is not stupid. 
b. So he can look up words in the dictionary. 
(29) a. Peter is not stupid. 
b. After all he can look up words in the dictionary. 
The use of so presents that (28b) is deal七withconclusion of (28a), and after 
αl also presents that〔29b)is dealt with proof of (29a). In every kinds of 
utterance, there is no limit the crossing between the obtained contextual 
affects and derived cog凶tivee釘ects.Accordingly, the speaker highlights the 
specific inference relation in using such expressions as so and afterαll,and 
impos巴sconstraints the hearer’s infer巴nceon the utteranc巴int巴rpreting
process. Hence, they make the r叩 geof the speaker’s inference narrower. 
An int巴ndedrelation between thes巴twoutterances is presented to h巴arer.
This constraint mal<es the hearer’s proc巴ssingcost lower and is supposed to 
be able to obtain the proper effects. It is quite well-organised inferential 
process mechanism. The filer you know can be considered language 
information encoding a procedural meaning in later chapter. 
4.3 Explicature and implicature of utterances 
The concept betw巴enimplicitness and explicitness in utt巴rance
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interpretations is also a fundamental distinction of relevance theory. It is the 
assertion that th巴constructingprocess of content of proposition with 
language expressions is highly decided pragmatically. In oth巴rwords, this is 
the pragmatic distinction, which is an explicit-implicit distinction of 
utterances. This distinction is what degree a speaker put overtly on 
sentence or does not凶plicitly,when people attempts to put her thoughts 
on the linguistic form. Sperber and Wilson (1995) de飴lethe explicitness as 
follows; 
(30) Explicitness: 
An assumption communicated by an utterance U is巴xplicitif紅ld
only if it is a development of a logical form encod巴dbyU. 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995, 82) 
From this definition, they claim that the speaker’s intended assumption 
belongs to either explicature, which is explicit contents of utterances, or 
implicature, which is加plicitassumption (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 182〕．
Explicature is the development of linguistic form encoding utt巴rances.Th巴
linguistic form is the conceptual representation which conforms to its 
proposition expressed. The process which the h巴arerrecov巴rsfrom 
incomplete並lguisticform is contained both (a) the (ful) proposition and 
〔b)the description of the speech act or propos抗ionalattitude of utterances. 
If taking this persp巴ctive,explicatures are derived from both linguistic 
encoding and pragmatic inferenc巴.On the other hand, the definition of 
implicature is som巴whatnegative; that is, al assumptions which are not 
explicature are defined as implicature. Let us demonstrate this distinction as 
加（31）ー（33).
(31) A: How isMary feeling after her first year at university? 
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B: She di世l'tget enough田litsand can’t continue. 
(32) MaηJon巴sdi命l'tget enough university cours巴unitsto qualify for 
second year study, and as a result, Mary cannot continue with 
university study. 
(33) Mary Jones is not feeling at al happy about this. 
(Carston 1988, 155) 
It can be considered that explicature given in (32) and implicatur巴in(33) 
can be conveyed to the hearer from B’B utterance加（31).The explicaturモ
(32) is derived with decoding and pragmatic inference. However, (33〕isan 
assumption which is not conv巴yedwith explicature (32); in short, this is 
implicature of (31). Implicature is recovered only with inference. 
However, the recovery of explicature is not only with the process of 
d巴codingand referenc巴 assignment.As Sperb巴rand Wilson explain, 
utterances typically have several exp且ctures.For instanc巴， Mary’sreply to 
Bil’s question in (34) might have several explicatures giv巴nin (35). 
(34) Peter: Did your son vis抗youat the weekend? 
Mary (happily): He did. 
(35) a. Mary’s son visited her at th巴week巴nd.
b. Mary says that her son visited her at the week巴nd.
c. Mary believes that h巴rson visited her at the weekend. 
d. Ma巧ris happy that h巴rson visited her at th巴weekend.
(Carston 2000, 14; 2002, 119) 
(35a) is, as we know, a (lower-level) explicature, and (35b）ー（35d)are al 
higher目levelexplicatur巴sThe explicature is that the proposition expressed 
pragmatically developed from the logical form which obtain巴dby出沼田stic
decoding of utterances. The higher-level explicatur巴in(35b) is embedd巴d
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加tothe sp巴echact scheme as 'Mary says thαt一’，and(35c) and (35d) are 
embedded into the scheme of speaker’s propositional attitudes of utteranc巴，
as 'Mαry believes thαt一： and‘Mαryis hα:ppy thαt一＇.All explicatures 
in (35a）ー（35d〕arenot always conv巴y巴dto the hearer. Based on the context 
of utterance, the hear巴rassumes only assumption to accomplish the 
cognitive efforts, which is enough to deal with the processing efforts. In 
Chapter 5, the filler you kηow will be discussed as a marker which 
contributes to the explicature, especially to higher-level explicature of the 
speaker's propositional attitude of utterance. 
Th巴proceduralmeaning of language expressions, by definition, never 
associates with the logical form of utterances, but effects on both explicit 
and implici七sidesof utterances. On the other hand, the conceptual meaning 
relates on the logical form of utterances and constructs proposition 
expressed, so consequently it concerns the explicit sid巴ofutterances. This 
distinction, which is between conceptual and procedural distinction 
(semantic distinction) and explicit and implicit distinction (pragmatic 
distinction), lead to a classification into three cat昭ories;（む巴xpr巴ssions
which has conceptual mea凶ngand contribute to explicit side of utterances, 
（臼） expressions which constraints to proc巴duralmea凶ngand contribut巴to
explicit side of utterances, and then （出〕 expr巴ssionswhich constraints to 
procedural meaning and contribute to implicit side of utterances. It can be 
considered that七h巴fileryou k旬。w(and well) would b巴clasifi巴dinto (i) 
加Chapter5. 
4.4 Metarepresentation 
Relevance theory considers that the starting point of communication by 
language is originally仕ominterpretive use. Th巴conceptof interpretive use 
can be captured with comparison of the descriptive use. The descriptive use 
is what utterances represent an actual situation. It would be true if it 
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describes accurately, or it would be f，山eif not accurate. We can consider 
that it is used for judging the truth. On the other hand, the inもerpretiveuse 
is the representation which repr巴sentsfrom other utterances or thoughts. It 
focuses on faithfulness, which can be reconstructed from original 
representation. This is the use based from the concept of resemblanc巴（Noh
2000; Wilson 2000). 
All utterances are representations. The targeted repres巴ntationsar巴not
always obj巴ctiv巴 situationsor thoughts of the speaker. That will be also 
representations that utterances and thoughts including the hearer or ideas 
which others people might be thinking. Relevance theory exp凶nsthat al 
utterances are defined as‘descriptiv巴’ or‘interpretive’bythe relation 
between speaker’s interpretations and出 representations.Consider (36）：・
(36) Frederick reproach巴dEliza be仕l.She had behaved inconsiderately. 
(Wilson 2000, 412) 
By understanding h巴rutterance, the hearer in (36) might entertain a seri巴s
of int巴rpretationsof th巴type加（37).
(37) a. Frederick says that she had behaved inconsid巴rately.
b. Frederick believ巴sthat she had behaved inconsiderately. 
c. The speaker says that Frederick believed that she had 
behaved inconsiderately. 
d. The speaker b巴lievesthat Frederick believ巴dthat she had 
behav巴dinconsiderately. 
The s巴condpart of (36) has possible interpretations given in (37a) or (37b). 
Interpretation (37a〕repr巴sentsas a lower representation, which is it 
represents descriptively. This utterance is not七hespeaker’s thought, just 
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adding the representation the speaker thinks true. On the other hand, (37b) 
is giv巴nth巴representationthat the speaker believes true, but also presents 
the thought or opinion the speaker has. That is, it is metarepresent巴d企om
lower representation as a thought of speaker’s belief. In this way, when the 
speaker’s thoughts are metarepr巴sented,the interpretation adding 
representations is called 'the interpretive use'. Furthermore, interpretations 
(37c) and (37d) are used in七巴rpretively.The speaker knows there are 
thoughts which are different from her, and sh巴interpretedthird person’s 
thoughts or ideas. That is to say, it is given representations to ideas of other 
people. From the r巴asonthat it is a representation of representation，比is
called ‘metarepresentation’． 
Metarepresentation is an ability that attributes other ideas or thoughts. 
Interpretations (37c）加d(37d〕presentone’s idea or opinion. The speaker 
of (37c) repr巴sentswords of another person, which is a dぜferentfrom h巴r
words, and (37d) represents the other’s thoughts, as different from the 
speaker’s thought. In this way, metarepresentation ability is considered to 
give representations as attributing to other people’s op註吐onsor thoughts. In 
relevance-th巴oreticaccount, when metarepresentation is used to manifest 
the speaker’s assumption from lower representation, it is explained it is used 
as echoic. When utterances are used interpr巴tably,the interpreting process 
cannot b巴seencovertly as in (37a〕IfFrederick says官lizabethhad behaved 
inconsiderately', the second utt巴ranceinterpreted as in (37a), which is the 
representation from what Frederick said. Th巴s巴condutt巴ranc巴in(36) i s 
enriched as pres巴n七ingthe sam巴巴xplicatur巴asin (37a〕Interpretations
(37a）〔37d)ar巴 al what example (36) is巴nr h巴dcov巴rtlyt 0
metarepresentation. That is, the speaker makes the hearer desired to be 
r巴levantconstruct the metarepresentation. 
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5 A meaning of you know 
In this chapter, along with the framework of relevanc巴theorypresented in 
Chapter 4, a semantic meaning of you kηow will be proposed as a unitary 
meaning. Let us look back to example (1〕again,which is th巴sameas in the 
introduction. 
(1) Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Mary: The tickets? 
Tom: (a) You know, the circus tickets. 
(b) Well, the circus tickets. 
〔c)The circus tick巴ts.
As seen in (1) from the introduction, both use of well and you know are 
accep七ableand have the same grammatical function. Nevertheless, both 
meanings in each sentence are intuitionally different. Each meaning could be 
argued in detail, but, it would appear that the speaker’s intention would be 
obviously different if he attempts to use the filer well or you know. 
To identiちra meaning and function that th巴fileryou kηow has, the 
property of you know in the rel巴vance-theoreticapproach should be 
clarified, along with Blakemore’s (2002) approach to well. To do this, 
Blakemore’s treatment of the filer well will be firstly clarified. She asserts 
that well is linguistic information that constrains procedural information and 
contributes to speaker’s high巴子levelexplicature. Along with her treatment 
of well, we attempt to continu巴to・discuss you know as ha羽ngthe same 
category as well. As seen in (1), even江bothwell and you know are in same 
categories, th巴sefunction and meanings are different. So, finally, the 
property of you know will be trγto be identified with relevanc巴－th巴oretic 
account. In particular, beyond Blakemore’s well explanation and making us巴
104 言語と文化論集 No.14
of the concept of metarepres巴ntation,the m巴a凶ngof you kηow that the 
speak巴rhas wil be made clear. After proposing a sem組 ticme紅白lgof you 
kηow as a hypothesis, we will attempt to demonstrate this with al examples 
of you kηow pres巴ntedin Chapter 3. 
5.1 The meaning of well: Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (1999, 
2001) 
The process of presenting a s巴manticme紅白gof well by Blakemor巴（2002〕
is explained through the relevance theory. Blakemore’s analysis proceeds 
with Schourup’s (1999, 2001) <•i. Throughout the argument of well, the 
property of filer you know will be presented. 
What we hav巴toconsider here is, first of al, that the filer well is 
language information which constrains to a procedural meaning. Among 
their discussion, the treatment of well as procedural constraints constituent 
is taken for granted (Blakemore 2002, 129-130). To further explore this 
meaning, let us look back at examples of discourse connective in Chapter 3. 
These discourse conn巴ctivesforce the hearer to mal'e a pragmatic註lference
working betw巴巴nthe antecedent and the following utterances, and to 
巴stablishthe connectively between them to relay a particular point to七he
hearer. Let us se巴（38)again: 
(38〕 A:
B: 
Anna’s much taller th紅lVer比y.
a. Well, she is two years older. (Blal,emore 2002, 130〕
b. You know, she is七woyears older. 
c. She is two years old巴r.
5 Jucker (1993) proposed the discourse marker叩d with relevance-theoretical acount, and 
!{]erk (2005〕alsodiscuses a procedural meaning of叩elin a corpus of Xhosa English. Both of 
them町ediscused with Blakemore’s idea of・procedural encoding of uterances. 
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This example is orig加alyused th巴caseof well. It may also be acceptable 
when you kηow is used on Tom’s utterance. Although a filer is not present 
in (38c), the hearer can understand B’B utterance. As you know, the filers 
well and you know have no concept at剖1.They do not contribute to the 
proposition expressed, but make the hearer have a c巴rtain註lferenc巴 Atthis 
point, the filler well, as well as you know, is shown to be languag巴
information which constrains a procedural meaning, and七heycould be 
categorised into the s紅n巴groupas discourse connectives such as but, after 
αl, and so. Along with the concept of conceptual and procedural distinction, 
Blakemore (2002) and Schourup (2001) insist that these discourse 
connectives and the fil巴rwell is a procedural constraints constituent, be加g
different in nature even though both of th巴fillersencode procedural 
constraints. Discourse connectives such as but, afterαl, and so c•i have been 
tr巴at巴das expressions which contribut巴toimplicit aspects of utterances, 
but is it possible to treat the filer well in the s紅mway? 
(39〕 A:
B: 
(40) A: 
B: 
I learnt thr巴巴newwords today. 
So? 
I learnt thr巴巴newwords today. 
Well? 
(Schourup 2001, 1054) 
According to Schourup (2001), the connective so in (39〕isunderstood to 
m巴anthat B isasking A what follows from her r巴mar1王，andthe filer well in 
' ( 40)implies that B is asking for the three specific words. The crucial 
difference here is that if so is understood to be activating a particular 
cognitive effect, whereas well is understood to signal that B would like more 
information (what are the three words?). In oth巴rwords, well has a function 
6 Se Blakemore (1988〕foran ar宮町田川ofprocedural meaning so. 
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as a marker to signal that utterance A is relevant to th巴hear巴rSo 
contribut巴sto the hearer’s implicit aspects, well contributes to the explicit 
asp巴ctof utterances. Blakemore presents (41) as a unitary account of well, 
and explains that well contributes to explicature, especially to higher-1巴vel
explicature. 
(41) Th巴speakerbelieves U is rel巴vant(where U is the utterance 
con ta加ingwell) (Blakemor巴2002,148) 
It could be regarded as a signal in the sense that抗activatesa higher-level 
explicature of th巴schemeabove. Setting aside the question of this reliability, 
Blakemore (2002) defines that the filer well is linguistic inforτnation which 
contributes to speaker’s higher level explicature and constrains procedural 
me創出lg.The argumentation of the filer you know can be extended to say 
that well and you know belong to the s釘necategory. 
5.2 The process to a unitary account of you know 
Along with Blakemore’s presentation of well, Noh (1998, 622) has also 
appealed tha七othersimilar expressions such as you s仰 oryou meαη 
should contribute to the speaker’s higher-level explicature. This paper w泊
discuss that you know also includes on巴ofthese categories. As we have 
seen with th巴explanationof well, howev巴r，抗canbe impossible to ~onsider 
that you know and well should have the same meaning. So, to find a unitary 
account of you kηow, two aspects need to be discussed to separate from the 
use of well; one is the relation with the proposition expressed these filers 
are attached to, the other is also relation with higher-level explicature. Along 
with these discussions, this res巴archintends to pres巴ntthat you know has a 
different meaning from well and has. an 'assertion’meaning as a unitary 
meaning. 
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5.2.1 Proposition and you know 
From al of the appearances of you kηow in Chapter 2, this research has set 
the three positions of its appearances加 sentencesgiven in ( 42) to be; 
utteranc巴ーinitial,medial, and final. 
(42〕 a. youknowP 
b. Pyouknow 
c. _you lmow P [P you lmow ＿］の
Along with the positions of you know, th巴rela世onof position between you 
伽 ow叩 dproposition is as in (42). However, that is not the same position as 
well. (43a〕ー（43d)ar巴alutt巴ranee-initialexamples. 
(43) a. Well, we need to leave soon. 
b. You know, we need to leave soon. 
c. Well, you know, we need to leave soon. 
d. ?You know, well, we need to leave soon. 
比canbe possible for both well and you kηow to be used sentence-initially. 
Looking at (43c), both filers well and you 加 oware acceptable to use at the 
same time in the same sentence. That might be proof that both of them do 
not have the same meaning. But if we look at ( 43d), it could be rather 
difficult to use this order. It is not impossible to use this fil巴r,but the use of 
(43c) is much more natural than (43d〕csi.It is questioned why (43d〕isnot 
permitted to be used in this order, being different from ( 42c〕.Blak巴more
(2002〕hasexplained in ( 41〕thatwell signals the speaker believes the 
7 Considertng al arguments by here, the form ‘P you know ’maybe e担sted,but there is no any 
examples in actual appearances in Chapter 2. 
8 Interestingly, even if we lok up the BNC data base, we can hardly obtain these filers泊 this
order. 
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utterance which contains well is relevant, and it could be said that you 
know has the possibility to be relevant. However, there is a reason this order 
is not permitted in ( 43d〕.Look at the following sentence-medial uses shown 
in (44）：・
( 44) [Talking about TV progr紅runewith friends] 
a. It isn’t really like ballet, but it looks sort of real -you 
know, like Candid Camera. (ENC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
b. It isn’t really like ballet, but it looks sort of real 
like Candid Camera. 
-well, 
c. It isn’t really like ballet, but it looks sort of real ? well, you 
know, lik巴CandidC紅nera.
d. ?It isn’t really like ballet, but it looks sort of r巴al-you 
know, well, like Candid Camera. 
Both well and you kηow in sent巴nce-medialuse are permitted to appear, 
with〔44c〕beingacceptable but is slightly odd, whil巴（44a）目（44b〕areal 
acceptable. It m巴ansthat you know cannot be used when other factors are 
inserted, just the same as sentence-initial use of you kηow. Example ( 45) 
shows sentence-final use of well and you kη口ω．
(45) a. ??We need to leave soon, well. 
b. We need to leave soon, you know. 
c. *We need to leave soon, well, you know. 
Schourup (2001) has also discussed that sentence-final use of well is not 
permitted as seen in (45a), while the use of you kηow is acceptable in 
(45b). B巴causesentence-final use of well is not accepted, it is hard to say 
that the use of you know here in ( 45c) is acceptable. 
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Different from the use of well, you know can be closely associated with 
the proposition of every sentence, r巴gardlessof its positions. Hence, we can 
predict that you know has a stronger relationship with proposition of 
S巴ntencethan well. Conversely, this relationship can be a reason that the 
strength of the proposition makes the filer you know appear加 anyposition 
of s巴ntenc巴s. According to various app巴arancesin Chapter 3 and Crystal 
and Davy’s (1975) study (see Chapter 2〕，utterance-medialuse of you kηow 
has been classified as one of the type of app巴arances,but eveηr you kηow 
utterance is attached closely to the proposition. That is, you know cannot 
appear only on the initial and final positions of each proposition. The 
appearance of you k旬。wcan be revised as in ( 46). 
(46) a. youlmowP 
b. Pyoulmow 
The relation between the proposition and you know is as shown in (46) c•i. 
Having a relation between them, it may be also predict巴dthat you Kηow has 
th巴intentionto巴xtractsomething from its proposition. Th巴r巴isthe 
possibility that it can be explain巴dwith the concept of higher-level 
explicature. 
9 Let us lok at not only the relation with叩el,but at discomse connectives but, which is a revised 
from (19〕ー
a. Yes, it is. But, you know，むheweather is not much beter then here at the moment. 
b. Yes，抗is.?You know, but the weather is not much be凶erthenhere a七themoment. 
〔Modifiedfrom Blakemore 2002, 96) 
Discourse connective but req凶resthe proposition of uterance, to (se Blakemore (1987, 1989, 
2000〕，Fraser(1998〕andRouchota (1990〕aboutan argument of property of but), but it does no七
be nece田町yto asociate closely with the proposition expressed. So, sentence〔a〕ismore natural 
than〔b〕Theuse of (b) is rather unacceptable, because it c畑町otbe accepted that the proposition 
inserted bit is combined ;vith you k叩O叩.It is also proof that the relationship between you初叩叩
and the proposition expressed is very strong and asociated closely each other. The relation ( 46) 
will b巴acceptablefrom this perspective as wel. 
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5.2.2 Higher level explicature and you know 
We have seen relation of th巴fileryou know to the propos此ionexpress巴d,
and found that you know tries to extract from the proposition expressed. 
So, this relationship you know with higher】levelexplicature will be explored 
here. Before discussing it, let us look back at an explanation of higher-level 
explicature in (34) and (35). While (35a) is a (lower-level) explicature, 
(35b）ー（35d〕areal higher-level explicatur巴s.(35b) is an embedded 
explicature (35a) in the speech act schema, and both (35b) and (35c) are 
embedded speaker's propositional attitudes of utterance. Obsen危lgthe idea 
of explicatures, consider (13) again. 
〔13) [Tal<由gabout the tickets they are going to obtain] 
Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Marγ：The tickets? 
Tom: You know, the circus tickets. 
〔47〕 (a〕 They are the circus tickets. 
(b〕 Tom says that七heyare the circus tickets. 
(c〕 You should lmow that it is the circus tickets. 
(d) You want to lmow that it is the circus tickets. 
As Tom utters 'you know, the circus tickets’， various explicatures are 
expected to be conveyed to the hearer. It can be considered that (47b）ー
(47d〕areal higher-level explicatures, while ( 4 7a) is an explicature. 
However, the filer you kηow, as well as well, is not categorised into ( 4 7b), 
say, which is not embedded into the speech act schema, rather categorised 
into (47c) and (47d). Consider (48), which are examples of illocutionary 
adverbs. 
(48) a. Frankly I confidentially, we need to leave soon. 
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b. Unfortunately, we need to leave soon. 
(49) a. I tel you frankly I confidentially that we need to leave 
soon. 
b. It is unfortunate that we need to leave soon. 
The illocutionary adverbs加（48) are able to paraphrase as in ( 49), but in the 
case of you kηow, it is impossible to do the same c10〕．
(50) You know, we need to leave soon. 
(51) a. ?I t巴1you you know that we n巴巴dto leave soon. 
b. *It is you know that we need to l巴avesoon. 
Both illocutionary adverbs and you kηow are出lguisticinformation which 
contributes to the higher-level explicature of speaker’B attitude, but as 
oppos巴dto the case of (48), (50) cannot be paraphrased as in (51). This is 
proof that you kηow has a different property from illocutionary adverbs. 
Going back to巴xample(13〕， Maryprobably does not know (or has 
forgotten) that the tickets are for the circus. Tom l王nowsthat Mary does no七
know it. The higher-level巴xplicatureof Tom’B utt巴ranceher巴wouldbe 
shown in (13'). 
(13') Tom wants Mary to remember that they are the circus tickets. 
10 The filer叩elc町田atalso paraphrase, either. It me叩sthat it also does not have the same 
nat国eas ilocutionary adverbs 
〔49’〕Well,we need to leave son. 
〔a)?I tel you叩elthat we need to leave son. 
(b) ＊抗is山elthat we need to leave son. 
〔Schourup2001〕
The argument of ilocutionary adverbs can be seen in Schourup〔2001〕andWilson and Sperber 
〔1993).
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(13') is an absolutely higher-level explicature of Tom’s utt巴ranee.As s巴巴nin 
section 5.2.1, you know would be closely associated with the proposition 
expressed. When th巴speakerutters the you know clause, the high巴r】level
explicature in (13') is derived closely from the proposition expressed. The 
speaker would convey the propositional attitude of his utterance. The use of 
you know can b巴consideredas a marker that the speaker tries to derive his 
thoughts or idea from the proposition expressed. Look at another exampl巴
(14): 
(14) A: I may catch a cold，紅ldneed some medicine. 
B: You know, they say an apple a day keeps the doctor away? 
(14’） We do not have to take medicine if we have an apple a day. 
What derived from B’s utterance in (14〕ishigher-level explicature, 
especially conveying speaker’s propositional attitude of utterance. B’s 
utterance in (14〕isnot as1也lgsomething to hearer A. The speaker tries to 
bring other assumptions ((14’〕 isone of them) which ar巴relatedto the 
proposition expressed to the h巴arer.Without using you kηow, the h巴arer
might be able to capture the assumptions, but it can make it clear that the 
hearer se巴sthe speaker’s intention. It is likely that you know is a k加dof 
marker to do it. Exploring only these examples (13) and (14), it can be 
predict巴dthat the filer you know is a maker which contributes to the 
high巴r-levelexplicature, especially to the speaker’s propositional attitud巴of
utteranc巴．
明治ena speaker utters the you know claus巴， thehearer infers from 
assumptions derived from the proposition expressed by the speaker. The 
hearer infers the assumption and thoughts the speaker wants to convey to 
hearer. This is the concept of metarepresentation. In other words, the 
speaker attempts to construct a metarepresentation to the hearer who wants 
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to be rel巴vant. The metarepresentation th巴he紅白rw坦haveis what the 
speaker wants to assert. By using the filler you know, the speaker 
metarepresents assumptions to the hear巴rwith th巴intentionof her 
assertion. 
5.2.3 As an assertion and its cause司anιeffect
There arises a question. It is questioned why the speaker attempts to assert 
something to the hearer and then what is the reason or grounds for this 
assertion ar巴.If asp巴ak巴rwould lik巴toassert something to a hearer, it is 
quite natural that there are reasons to do so. From the r巴lationwith the 
proposition express巴dgiven in ( 46), let us continue to look at the exampl巴S
in (13) and (22) again, which (13) is an utterance-initial and (22) is an final 
use. 
(13) [Tal<山gabout the tickets they are going to obtain] 
Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Mary: The tickets? 
Tom: You know, the circus tickets. 
(13’） Tom wants Mary to remember that th巴yare the circus tickets. 
(13”） Because Tom isgoing to get the tickets. 
What are the grounds for speaker’s assertion of representation to the hearer 
as in (13’〕？It is because Tom is go加gto get the circus tickets. This is given 
in (13づ.The reason would also be the assumption Tom has. It can be 
considered tha七thespeaker forces the hear巴rto know the speaker’B 
metarepresented representation, shown in (13’）， with using the you know 
clause. Consider example (22), which is an utterance-final use. 
(22) A: Do you lmow him? 
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B: I know Ian. He looks very handsome now. He is an actor, 
you know? 
A: Yeah, his eyes are a very nice colour. 
(Mod江iedENC, The meddlers 1970〕
(22') The speaker wants to confirm to hearer that he is an actor. 
(22”） Because he looks very handsome now. 
Example (22〕canalso be explained by th巴sameapproach as〔13).Speaker 
B, by uttering the you know clause, makes hearer A represent h巴r
metarepresented assumption shown in (22'). The reason is, of course, the 
fact that Ian looks very handsome now, which is given in (22” 
b巴anassu立lptionthe speaker has. 
Here, a hypothesis of a s巴manticmeaning of you know c担 beproposed. 
The filer you kηow is explained as language information which encodes 
procedural constraints and contributes to th巴speaker’shigher level 
explicature. Considering these aspects of the property of you know 
explored above, the hypothesis can be proposed with a scheme (52) as the 
speaker’s assertion. 
(52) Q. youlmowP 
P: The proposition associated dos巴lywith the filer you know 
R: The metar『巴presentatedassumption from P 
Q: The ground (or reason) for R (an assumption th巴spe此er
has from previous or r巴latedutterances) 
P is the proposition express巴dby the you know clause (see 5.2.1, the 
relation of you kη口wwith the proposition is flexible, as shown in (46)), R is
a speak巴r’Sm巴tarepresentedass田nptionderived from P, and then Q, which 
is the fact or assumption the speaker has, is the ground for R. As the speaker 
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forces the hearer to infer the metarepresenteci assumption (R), which is 
derived from the close proposition expressed (P〕ofth巴youkηow 
utterance, the speaker would have the intention to assert something to the 
hearer. The ground from R, which could be a reason or caus巴 ofthe 
speak巴r'syou know utterance, would be th巴speaker'santecedence 
assumption in utterances. This research would like to assert here that the 
filler you kηow could be a marker which asserts metar『巴presented
assumption (R) deriv巴dfrom P, and then justifies a cause回and-effectrelation 
in context. In the next section, the reliability of this hypothesis will be 
verified with the data presented加Chapter3. 
5.3 Demonstration 
From al th巴 datapresented in Chapter 3, the hypothesis (52〕willbe 
ver江ied,which presents a semantic mean担gof you know. First, let us start 
from utt巴rance-initialuses (13), (14）叩d(16). (13) is an巴xamplewhere 
you know is used as the sp.eaker's assertion. 
(13) [Talldng about the tickets they are going to obtain] 
Tom: I’m going to get the tickets. 
Mary: The tickets? 
Tom: You know, the circus tickets. 
(Modified from Crystal and Davy 1975, 93〕
P: They are th巴circustick巴ts.
R: The speaker wants七hehearer to remember that they are 
the circus tickets. 
Q: [Because] th巴speakeris going to get the tickets. 
Tom may have an assumption such as‘he is going to get the circus tickets.’ 
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By uttering the you know clause, he makes Mary represent R as an 
assertion. Mary interprets the representation R as Tom’B metarepresented 
assumption, and then she knows that its reason is Q. At that time, Mary 
interprets not only that they are the circus tickets but also Tom’s attitude 
toward getting the tickets. Consider example (14): 
(14) A: I may catch a cold, and need some medicine. 
B: You know, they say an apple a day keeps the doctor away? 
(Schiffrin 1987, 275) 
P: People say an apple a day keeps the doctor away. 
R: w巴donot have to take medicine if we have an apple a day. 
Q: [Because] people need not take any medicine. 
Speaker B probably has an assumption Q from A's previous utterance. When 
th巴 speakerutters the you kηow clause, she tries to r巴presenta 
metarepresented assumption to the hearer. The hearer understands Rand 
knows Q as the reason for R. Let us look at pr巴senting(or adding〕a
concrete example (16) c叫
1 Example (15) is treated the same as (14〕， whichis utterance-initial use and used as the 
speal仁er’Sintroducing new information. We explain in detail here. 
〔15〕［Concerninga question about relation between吐.1eもwo]
I thought that we were friends like. You know, lilce boy世iendand g凶friend.
P: We are like boyfriend and girl剖end.
R: We have been dating together like a couple. 
Q: [Because] we are friends like. 
(BNC, Bily Bayswater 1990〕
An assumption the speaker has is probably that‘we are friends, like’〔Q). By the speaker’s 
utterance of (15), the spealrnr attempts to make hearer know a representation R, which is a 
metarepresentation for P. The hearer sees七herepresentati印.1R, and he realises Q as the re田onor 
grounds for it. 
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(16) [A, talk加gwith friend BJ 
A: It was the first t耐leI entered the music room. 
B: Which room? 
A: You know, that lovely room with its medieval instruments. 
(BNC, Tomorrow 1991〕
P: The room is the lovely one with its medieval instruments. 
R: The speaker is really surprised that the room is lovely and 
there are medieval instruments in it. 
Q: [Because] the speaker entered the music room for the first 
tim巴．
Speaker A has an assumption that sh巴enteredthe music room for the first 
time (Q). By A’s uttering the you kηow clause, the hearer knows th巴
re pr巴sentationR from the sp巴ak巴r,and then sees Q as the reason for R. 
Second, let us look at utterance-medial uses (17）ー（20〕.Example 〔17〕
shows introducing new information, and (18〕presents(17) pr巴sents(or 
adds) concrete examples. 
(17) [Bily tels his daughter] 
Bily: I suppose if you work at凶ght.Marie used to do that when 
I met her -you know, sleep al day and七hengo out at 
night. (BNC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
P: Marie slept al day and then went out at凶ght.
R: B副ywants his daughter to know that Marie used to sleep 
al day and then go ut at night when Billy met Marie. 
Q: [Because] the sp巴akersupposes if his daughter might work 
at凶ght.
(18) [Talking TV progr訂版newith friends] 
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It isn’t r巴alylike ballet, but抗lookssort of real -you know, like 
Candid Camera. (BNC, Billy Bayswater 1990) 
P: The TV programme is like Candid Camera. 
R: Th巴 speakerasserts that the TV programme looks like 
Candid Camera. 
Q: [Because] it looks sort of real. 
Th巴speaker,Bily, has an assumption that he supposes江hisdaughter might 
work at night (Q〕Bysaying the sentence contained the you know clause 
(you know, sleep al day and then go ou七atnight), his daughter knows th巴
representation R and then realises Q will be the reason for R目 Thespeaker 
〔18)has an assumption that the TV programme looks r巴al(Q). By uttering 
the sentence cont剖n加gyou kηow, the hearer knows the representation R 
from the speaker and then realises Q will be th巴reasonJor R問.Consider 
example (19): 
(19) A: I suppose that it’s summer in New Zealand now. 
B: Yes it is. But/ However, you know, the weather is not 
much better than here at the moment. 
(Modified from Blakemore 2002, 96〕
P: The weather is not much better than here at the moment. 
R: It is not better to go to New Zealand at this moment. 
Q: [Because] it is summer in New Zealand now. 
After listening to A’s utterance and B answering 'yes，抗is’， speakerB has an 
assumption that it is summer in New Zealand now. By uttering the but 
12 Both the speaker and hearer need to have common knowledge about Candid Camera, which is a 
TV programme, but it can be explained as encyclopaedic knowledge in relevance-theoretic 
acount. 
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clause, the representation R derived from P is metarepresented by the 
hearer. The reason for this representation is Q, which is that it is summer in 
New Zealand now. This example might need to be巴xaminedfrom discourse 
connective b叫 (13).
(20) [Mariana bowls out Trent for some reasons] 
You did a mistake again! I'm not useless, you know, and you can’t 
do eveηrthing on your own. 
(BNC,A且stairMacLean’s golden girl 1992) 
P: The speaker is not useless. 
R: Mariana wants to assert by compared with Trent that she 
is not useless. 
Q: [Because] Trent can’t do eve乃花凶ngon her own. 
From the utterances before the you know clause，‘You did a mistake ag記n！’
speaker A has the assumption that she is not useless. By the speaker’B 
utt巴r加gthe you know clause, she metar巴presentsthe representation R to 
the h巴arer,where the representation R is metarepresented from th巴
proposition P. It is quite clear that the filer you kηow plays the role of a 
marker to metarepresent to the hearer. The reason or grounds for the 
metarepresented assumption R would be Q. The reason for this 
re pr巴sentationis Q, which is that Trent can’t do everything on her own目
Third, utt巴rance-finalus巴swill be demonstrated; (21〕isthe speak巴r’s
assertion and (22) is confirmation examples. 
(21〕［Sp巴akerlooks at Dorothy, who does not look good fee加lg]
A: What’s going on Dorothy? What has been happening? You 
13 Refer to fo七note〔9).
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look really pale, you know. 
(BNC, Part of the furniture 1991) 
P: Dorothy looks really pale. 
R: Speaker suggests that Dorothy should bett巴rto see the 
doctor. 
Q: [Because] speaker A !mows Dorothy does not look good. 
From the utterances before the you kηow clause，‘What’s going on Dorothy? 
What has been happe凶ng?',speaker A has the assumption that Dorothy has 
not been in good heath. By the speaker’B uttering the you kηow clause, she 
me tar巴pr巴sentsthe representation R to the hearer, where the representation 
R ismetarepresented企omthe proposition P. It is quite clear that th巴filer
you kηow plays the role of a marker to metarepresent to the hearer. The 
reason or grounds for the metarepresented assumption R would b巴Q.
Consider (22〕，whichis an example of the sp巴aker’Sconfirmation: 
(22) A: 
B: 
Do you lmow him? 
I lmow Ian. He looks very handsome now. He is an actor, 
you know? 
A: Yeah, his巴yesare a v巴巧rnice colour. 
(Mo出直巴dBNC, The Meddlers 1970) 
P: Ian is an actor. 
R: The sp巴ak巴rwants to confirm tha七Ianis an actor. 
Q: [Because] Ian looks very handsome now. 
By B’s uttering the you kηow clau日e,the representation R derived from P is
m巴tarepresentedby the hearer, along with her assertion that Ian is an actor. 
The hearer lmows R, and as the reason for R he confirms Q. 
Finally, look at巴xamples(23) and (24〕.Example (23〕isan example 
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which has more than two you kηow appear加gin a sentence and (24) is on巴
which has no obvious proposition. 
(23) [Lool也lgat a friend who is riding a horse for the first t註ne]
A: It is the first七江nefor him to rid巴ahorse, isn’t it? 
B: Yeah, you know, he loops up on the horse, you know. 
(BNC,Appr巴ciationof literatur巴1950)
Even if there are two filers in a sentence, each mea1ling of you know is 
different企omthe other. So，此isnecessary to observe them separately; the 
former as (a), th巴latteras (b). 
(a) P: 
R: 
The friend loops up on the hors巴
Speaker B asserts that the friend attempts to loop up on 
the horse now. 
Q: [Because] it is the first t恒lefor the friend to ride a horse. 
(b) P: The fri巴ndloops up on th巴horse.
R: Speaker B confirms that the friend is looping up on the 
horse now. 
Q: [Becaus巴lit is the first t卸ほforthe企iendto ride a horse. 
Both (a) and (b〕havethe same proposition, but the representation R 
derived from P should be different. Even if representations R in (a) a1ld (b) 
are different, their reasons or grounds would be Q, which would be the same 
assumption of the speaker. This example is proof that the pres巴nt加gunitary 
account is right, reg訂dlessof the position of you加 ow.(24) is a you 伽 ow
utterance, which does not have a proposition. 
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(24) A: 
B: 
What did you say? 
Oh, you know. 
A: V.なmt?
B: Just, I wanted to ask what your far凶lywaslike. 
P: [Speaker B wanted to ask what A’s family was like] 
R: Speaker B hesitat巴toask hearer A [what A’s far吐lywas 
凶rn].
Q: [Because] speaker B does not lmow that it is better to ask 
what A’s family was like. 
The sr七uationthis you kηow utterance gives that the speaker has hesitated 
to say something to the hearer. As you see A’s utt巴ranee明白atdid you say?', 
B has the assumption that it would be good if she can ask him such a thing 
because, for example, she has lmown that he has not had good relations with 
his family for a long time. The speaker metarepresents R to the hearer. The 
proposition here would be P, but even if there is no proposition, the sp巴akers
can metarepresent R to the hearer. The hearer sees the metarepresented 
assumption R and then Q would be the reason for R. 
6. Conclusion 
This res巴archhas focus巴don the filer you know with relevanc巴－theoretic
approach, from its various appearances shown in Chapter 2, and then 
verified how scheme (52) is organised as a unitary meaning. In conclusion, a 
semantic meaning of you know will be shown in (53〕．
(53) A semantic meaning of you kηow: 
Procedural me紅白g:Asser出igR, which is th巴metarepresentationof 
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Contributes to high巴子level巴xplicature
You know is analysed as language information which constrains to a 
procedural me紅白gof utterances and contributes to speaker’s higher-1巴vel
explicature by asserting the metarepresentation R. To metarepresent the 
re pr巴sentationis that, within the approach of relevance theory, it is 
巴mbedd巴das higher-level representation in utterances. In this sense, the 
filer you kηow cannot be categorised into discour『seconnectives such as 
but, afterαl and so, which Blakemore introduced (see 5.1). 
There are some issues what need to b巴discussedfurther. It can be 
considered that various inferences are conc巴rnedin understanding you 
know utterance than we expect. The many assumptions are recovered in 
interpreting utterances, that is, it is can be considered that the 
metarepresentation is consisted of many lay巴rs.If we think it so, th巴you
know utterance can be considered as echoic u七terancesas shown in 4.4 ciの．
The proposal of a semantic meaning you know in (53) may be just tiny 
proposals in this research. The furth巴rres巴archwill be r巴quir巴d.
Secondly, to propose the meaning of you わiowwith metarepresentation, 
it can b巴regardedthat th巴explanationof well, which is proposed by 
Blakemore (2002), might not be well orgar由ed.It can be predicted that a 
semantic meaning of well presented in (41〕needsto be discuss巴dmore in 
detail, which is not just a semantic meaning of spealcer’s belief that utteranc巴
is relevant. If making use of the concept of metarepresentation, that is 
approaching the same way as you know, th巴reis the possibility that well is 
present巴das a revised m巴創1ingin d巴tail.This has to be left further research. 
Furthermore, there are many other kinds of l加 guagefiler such as I m仰旬
14 Refer to Noh (1995, 1998, 2000) for町呂田nen回aboutechoic uterances in relevance theoretic 
account 
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紅ldyou see, which are not discussed with this relevance-theoretic approach 
yet. It may be possible that the further argum巴ntationof you know can be 
expected by finding their functions or meanings. The study of this field is 
just now beg加ning.Relevance theory as cognitive pragmatics has semantics 
which operates with the cognitive process in utteranc巴int巴rpretation.This 
concept of semantics can be observed into the use of the tiny language filer 
you know. 
This paper is based on my MA disertation submitted to the University of Leeds in 2007. There町e
many people who have helped me on my way to this paper. Especially, Dr. Bethan L. Davies 
〔Universityof Leeds) gave me intelectual inspiration and support as my supervisor. Other staf 
members and classmates in the Department of Linguistics and Phonetics also gave me some useful 
comments, especialy about the data colection. Once ag阻1,I would回目tothank al in Leeds. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A: Criteria for obtaining the filler you know data 金omthe 
British National Corpus 
J. All possible sentences including you加削uare extracted from the BNC database. 
2. Filter out some you Imo叩 sentenceswhich include within their proposition. Such you 
know data w出betreated as non-filler language information (as in Table A〕
Tlte First Step 
3 Other yoit加w叩 data,which has a possibility to be treated as a filer, is arrar唱edwi出 some
meanings and functions, or positions (sentence-m1tial, medial, and final, as treated by 
Crystal叩 dDavy 〔1975〕（15)
4. Cl田si町al百ouImo叩 sentencesaccording to then・ posiもionsas in Table B and predictable 
meanings as in Table C of出eAppend皿
(2-1) 
1. With assistance of a native speaker of English, set up possible contexts of each example 
sentence and sentences in previous studies、.viththe same criteria田 thosefrom吐reBNC.
(2 2〕
2 F切mthis data, choose some for discussion with reg町dto the positions of appear叩 cesand 
their mear由rgs.So as to re日nethese example sentences, refer吐remto approxinrately 10 
Tlte Second Step native speakers of English so田 tomake further judgmen同.The native speakers血・echosen 
from v凹ousages, genders, and occupations [3 undergraduates (2 female and 1 male in the 
University of Leeds and出eLeeds Metropolit田 University),2 postgradua匝S〔'femalein the 
University of Leeds), 2 office workers in Leeds (one is working in a hospital), and 1 
housewife]. A且ofthem are British English speakers or English speakers living in世reUK. 
3. They are asked about acceptab血tyof al of the presented you knotυsentences, and, at the 
san1e凶.ne,asked how intonation wi且bechanged 
Appendix B: Data collection from the British National Corpus 
B-1. All you know data from BNC 
Appearances 
Filler 460 0.461 
Non filer 506 0.504 
Fixed forms 35 0.035 
1001ヰ 1 
15 Refer to the argumentation by Crystal and Davy (1975〕
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B-2. Numbers and rate of appeared positions of you know. 
Appear.町ices
Sentence-initial 40 0.087 
Sentence-meclial 206 0.448 
Sentence-final 214 0.465 
460 1 
B・3.Numbers and rate of each meaning of filler you kno即．
Positions Meanings of you k1叩叩 Appearances 
Sentence-initial Introcluch1g new infonnation 16 0.035 
Presenting concrete examples II 0.024 
Speaker's assertion 13 0.028 
Sentence-rnechal Introducing new hlforrnation 39 0.085 
Present皿gconcrete examples 93 0.202 
Speaker's assertion 52 0.113 
Reconfirmation 22 0.048 
Sentence final Speaker’s assertion 155 0.337 
Reconfirmation 59 0.128 
460 I 
中Alldata h田 beentaken from the BNC database operated by the Department of Translation Studies 
h1 the University of Leeds. This database cam1ot obtain more than 1000 data m担dmally.
